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Abstract
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interac-
tion superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining
procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is
presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model;
a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to
classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value
in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in stan-
dard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may
not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.
1 Introduction
In this paper we take the following point of view on cooperation and bargain-
ing: there is an underlying physical reality represented by a game in strategic
form, and bargaining is a noncooperative interaction that acts through an
institutional setup superimposed on the strategic form. In a sense the aim
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1of the institutions is to induce bargaining processes that lead to a selection
of ﬁnal play that is eﬃcient.
Our outlook is inspired both by cooperative game theory and by gen-
eral equilibrium theory. As in cooperative game theory we aim to handle
situations with an arbitrary number of players and recognize that allowing
for the possibility of partial breakdown of the negotiation is of the essence
(in cooperative games, partial breakdown is captured by the speciﬁcation of
what coalitions other than the grand coalition can obtain). From general
equilibrium theory we import the paradigm of a sharp distinction between
the underlying data (preferences, endowments, and technologies in general
equilibrium, the strategic form here) and the institutions that operate in
them (typically markets in general equilibrium, bargaining procedures here).
We are not the ﬁrst to argue that a general theory of bargaining should
be built over a strategic form. It was already the position taken by Nash
(1953) in his proposal for the endogeneization of the threat points of his
axiomatic theory of bargaining (Nash, 1950), a proposal that was extended
to N-player situations by Harsanyi (1959, 1963). As for cooperative game
theory, the need of a strategic-form foundation has been persistently felt.
One suggestion was provided for the transferable-utility (“TU”) case by the
founders (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, proposed to deﬁne what
a coalition could reach as the maximin level for the sum of the payoﬀs of
the members of the coalition), and later generalized (Aumann, 1959) to the
non-transferable-utility (“NTU”) case in the guise of the “alpha” and “beta”
coalitional forms. Dissatisfaction with these deﬁnitions drew attention to
particular classes of games where the determination of the coalitional form
appeared uncontroversial (the “c-games” of Shapley–Shubik, a leading ex-
ample of which is exchange economies; see Shubik, 1983, Section 6.2.2), and
thus the theory of bargaining could be nicely factored through the coali-
tional form. We will have some opportunity to debate this point (see Section
7 below).
We shall make a speciﬁc proposal for a bargaining procedure, what we
call the “proposer commitment” (PC) procedure. We do not pretend that it
is the most general procedure since plainly it is not, but we do believe that it
2is comparatively simple and that in applications it captures some important
features.
The PC procedure is inspired by Nash (1953) in a crucial feature: we
assume that players can commit to threats. We view this commitment pos-
sibility as going hand in hand with the set of strong institutions that must
be in place if, as we assume, the outcome of bargaining is enforceable. But
we depart from Nash (1953) in an important aspect: at each step of the ne-
gotiations only one player (the “proposer”) makes threats. We do so because
we want a bargaining procedure that, in the spirit of modern bargaining the-
ory (see, e.g., Binmore, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1992), has as players the
players of the original, underlying strategic form. In the two-player setting
of Nash (1953), his simultaneous threats model can be made to pass this
test (replace, for example, the axiomatically based part of his solution by
bargaining in the style of Stahl–Rubinstein; see, e.g., Osborne and Rubin-
stein, 1990, and Houba and Bolt, 2002), but the N-player generalization of
Harsanyi (1959, 1963) does not, at least to our knowledge (Harsanyi deﬁnes
a sort of noncooperative bargaining, but it is between ﬁctitious players, one
for each coalition). Thus in a sense (reminiscent of Shapley, 1969) we could
present our solution as a simpliﬁcation of the Nash–Harsanyi approach.
There is another source of inspiration for the PC approach: the bar-
gaining procedure formulated by ourselves (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996a) for
the context where the underlying reality is a game in coalitional form. The
sequential nature of the announcements and proposals we take from there,
along with the idea that a rejected proposer becomes passive for the rest of
the game (with some probability). But the consideration of a strategic form
as the underlying reality allows us now to enrich the determination of what
happens with the play of the rejected proposer.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model and the PC
bargaining procedure are presented. In Section 3 we establish the standard
existence and optimality properties. In Section 4 we focus on two special
cases: two-person games and games with transferable utility. In Section 5 we
discuss, in a particular context where the threats turn out to be “ﬁxed” in
equilibrium, a general connection of the PC solution with the Shapley value
3in the TU case. In Sections 6 and 7 we reexamine the concept of c-games
(in particular the standard class of exchange economies) as candidates for
the sort of simpliﬁcation that would allow the factorization of bargaining
analysis through a coalitional form (deducible from the fundamentals of the
game). We discover an important diﬀerence between TU games—for which
the simpliﬁcation is possible (see Section 6)—and general NTU games—for
which it is not. We show the latter in Section 7 by means of an example
related to the transfer paradoxes of general equilibrium theory.
2 The Model
The basic data is an N-person game in strategic form G = (N,(Ai)i∈N,(ui)i∈N),
where N is a ﬁnite set of players, and each player i ∈ N has a ﬁnite set of ac-
tions Ai and a payoﬀ function ui : A → R, with A :=
 
i∈N Ai. A mixed action
of player i is xi ∈ ∆(Ai), where ∆(Ai) = {(xi(ai) ∈ RAi
+ :
 
ai∈Ai xi(ai) = 1}
is the probability simplex on Ai.
For each set of players S ⊂ N (a coalition), let AS :=
 
i∈S Ai denote
the set of pure action combinations of the members of S. A correlated action
of S is zS ∈ ∆(AS), a probability distribution on pure action combinations
of S. The payoﬀ functions are as usual multilinearly extended to mixed and
correlated actions.
2.1 The Proposer-Commitment (PC) Procedure
We now introduce the basic bargaining procedure.
Let 0 ≤ ρ < 1 be a ﬁxed parameter; think of ρ as the probability of
“repeat.” The bargaining proceeds in rounds. In each round there is a set
S ⊂ N of “active” players, the actions of each “inactive” player j / ∈ S being
ﬁxed at some bj ∈ Aj; put bN\S = (bj)j∈N\S. We will refer to ω = (S,bN\S)
as a state. Initially, everyone is active, i.e., S = N (and so the starting state
is (N, )). Each round, with state ω = (S,bN\S), proceeds as follows.
1. A “proposer” k ∈ S is selected out of S at random, with all members
of S being equally likely to be selected.
42. The proposer k chooses a pair (zS,xk), where zS ∈ ∆(AS) is a corre-
lated action of S and xk ∈ ∆(Ak) is a mixed action of player k; think
of zS as a “proposed agreement” for S, and of xk as a “threat.”
3. Each player in S is asked, in some order (deterministic or random),
whether he accepts or rejects the proposed agreement zS.
4. If they all agree to zS, then the procedure ends as follows: a joint action
aS ∈ AS is selected according to the distribution zS, and the N-tuple
of actions (aS,bN\S) ∈ A is played in the original strategic game G.
5. If at least one player in S rejects zS, then with probability ρ the state
does not change (it remains ω=(S,bN\S); we call this “repeat”), and
with probability 1 − ρ the rejected proposer k becomes inactive.
6. If the rejected proposer becomes inactive, then the randomization xk is
performed; let bk ∈ Ak be its realization. The action of player k is ﬁxed
from now on at bk ∈ Ak, and the new state is ω′ = (S\{k},(bN\S,bk)):
the set of active players is S\{k} and the actions of the inactive players
are (bN\S,bk).
7. A new round is started (i.e., one goes back to step 1), with the state
being the same ω in case of repeat, and ω′ as in step 6 otherwise.
2.2 Outcomes and Equilibria
We are interested in the (subgame-)perfect equilibria of the PC procedure that
are, in addition, as simple as possible, i.e., stationary. This means that the
decisions of the players depend only on the payoﬀ-relevant variables, not on
the history nor on the calendar time. Formally, for each state ω = (S,bN\S)
and proposer k ∈ S, the announcement (zS,xk) of player k depends only
on S, bN\S, and k, and the decision of each player i ∈ S\k to accept or
reject depends only on S, bN\S, k, zS, xk, and i. Stationary subgame-perfect
equilibria will be called SP equilibria for short.
5For simplicity, we will assume that each player uses the tie-breaking rule
of accepting a proposal when accepting it and rejecting it give him the same
expected payoﬀ.
The play of the PC procedure ends with probability one (since ρ < 1); its
end result is an N-tuple of actions a ∈ A in the original game G (see step 4
in the PC procedure), which we call the ﬁnal N-tuple of actions. This ﬁnal
a is random: it depends on the randomizations of nature (e.g., selecting the
proposers and repeating or not after rejection) and of the players themselves.
Fix an N-tuple of stationary strategies σ = (σi)i∈N.
For each state ω = (S,bN\S), let αω ∈ ∆(A) denote the probability dis-
tribution of the ﬁnal N-tuple of actions in the subgame starting from state
ω. Since the actions of the players outside S are ﬁxed at bN\S, the random-
ness aﬀects only the actions of the players in S, and so αω = ζ
S
ω × {bN\S}
for some ζ
S
ω ∈ ∆(AS). We refer to ζ
S
ω as the outcome of state ω. Similarly,
ζ
S
ω,k ∈ ∆(AS) denotes the probability distribution of the ﬁnal actions of S
after k ∈ S has been selected as proposer; we call it the outcome of state
ω = (S,bN\S) and proposer k. Since the proposer is equally likely to be any
member of S, we have1
ζ
S
ω =
1
|S|
 
k∈S
ζ
S
ω,k (1)
for every state ω = (S,bN\S). The collection of outcomes ζ
S
ω and ζ
S
ω,k for all
possible states and proposers (i.e., ω = (S,bN\S) for S ⊂ N, bN\S ∈ AN\S,
and k ∈ S) will be called an outcome conﬁguration (obtained from σ) and
will be denoted ζ.
For every k ∈ S and every bk ∈ Ak, let (ω||bk) := (S\k,(bN\S,bk)) denote
the state obtained from ω when k becomes inactive and his action is ﬁxed at
bk; for every xk ∈ ∆(Ak) let
η
S
ω,k(x
k) :=
 
bk∈Ak
x
k(b
k)
 
ζ
S\k
(ω||bk) × {b
k}
 
∈ ∆(A
S) (2)
be the expected outcome for S following the implementation of the threat
1For a ﬁnite set Z, we denote by |Z| the number of elements of Z.
6xk. We will say that an announcement (zS,xk) ∈ ∆(AS)×∆(Ak) of player k
is “acceptable” if, when the continuation is according to ζ, each responder’s
payoﬀ from accepting zS is no less than his payoﬀ from rejecting it, i.e.,
u
i(z
S,b
N\S) ≥ ρu
i(ζ
S
ω,b
N\S) + (1 − ρ)u
i(η
S
ω,k(x
k),b
N\S) (3)
for every i ∈ S\k (recall that after rejection with probability ρ the state re-
mains ω and with probability 1−ρ player k becomes inactive and his threat is
implemented). Let Y ≡ Yω,k(ζ) denote the set of acceptable announcements
of k :
Y := {(z
S,x
k) ∈ ∆(A
S) × ∆(A
k) : (3) holds for every i ∈ S\k},
and let Y ∗ ≡ Y ∗
ω,k(ζ) be the set of those acceptable announcements that
maximize the payoﬀ of the proposer2 k:
Y
∗ := arg max
(zS,xk)∈Y
u
k(z
S,b
N\S).
Finally, denote by Z ≡ Zω,k(ζ) and Z∗ ≡ Z∗
ω,k(ζ) the projections of the sets
Y and Y ∗, respectively, on the zS-coordinate:
Z := {z
S ∈ ∆(A
S) : (z
S,x
k) ∈ Y for some x
k ∈ ∆(A
k)};
Z
∗ := {z
S ∈ ∆(A
S) : (z
S,x
k) ∈ Y
∗ for some x
k ∈ ∆(A
k)}.
We claim that the SP equilibrium conditions on the outcome conﬁguration
ζ can be stated as
ζ
S
ω,k ∈ Z
∗
ω,k(ζ) (4)
for every state ω = (S,bN\S) and k ∈ S. Note that (4) is a ﬁxed-point-type
condition.
Proposition 1 An outcome conﬁguration ζ is obtained from an SP equilib-
rium of the PC procedure if and only if ζ satisﬁes condition (4) for all states
ω = (S,bN\S) and k ∈ S.
2We write argmax for the set of maximizers.
7Proof. Let ζ satisfy the conditions (4). Deﬁne an N-tuple of strategies σ
as follows: in state ω = (S,bN\S), when k ∈ S is the proposer he announces
an element (˜ zS, ˜ xk) ∈ Y ∗
ω,k with ˜ zS = ζ
S
ω,k, and when i ∈ S is a responder
he accepts a proposal zS if and only if (3) holds. It is straightforward to
verify (using a “one-deviation property” as in, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994, Lemma 98.2) that σ constitutes an SP equilibrium, and its outcome
conﬁguration is precisely the given ζ.
Conversely, let σ be an SP equilibrium with outcome conﬁguration ζ.
Take a state ω = (S,bN\S) and a proposer k ∈ S, and consider a single devia-
tion from σ, at this point only, by player k. We claim that the set of outcomes
that k can induce is precisely Z ≡ Zω,k(ζ). Indeed, an announcement (zS,xk)
yields acceptance by all players in S\k if and only if conditions (3) hold, i.e.,
if and only if (zS,xk) ∈ Y (by the equilibrium requirement when there is
strict inequality, and by the tie-breaking rule when there is equality). When
(zS,xk) is rejected the continuation outcome is ¯ zS := ρζ
S
ω + (1 − ρ)ηS
ω,k(xk),
and here too we have (¯ zS,xk) ∈ Y (conditions (3) hold as equalities). There-
fore we have shown that Z, the projection of Y on the zS-coordinate, is in-
deed the set of all possible outcomes that k can induce at this point (whether
there is acceptance or rejection). But k maximizes his payoﬀ (since σ is an
equilibrium), from which condition (4) follows. ¤
We note two simple but useful facts. For every state ω = (S,bN\S) let3
C(ω) := {u
S(z
S,b
N\S) ∈ R
S : z
S ∈ ∆(A
S)}
be the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors for the coalition S at ω (i.e., given the
ﬁxed actions bN\S ∈ AN\S of the players outside S).
Lemma 2 Let σ be an SP equilibrium with outcome conﬁguration ζ. For
every state ω = (S,bN\S) and k ∈ S:
(i) Yω,k(ζ) is a nonempty polytope; and
3We write uS(z) for the payoﬀ vector (ui(z))i∈S ∈ RS.
8(ii) there does not exist c ∈ C(ω) such that c ≥ uS(ζ
S
ω,k) with strict inequality
ck > uk(ζ
S
ω,k) in the k-th coordinate.4
Proof. (i) The set Y is nonempty since for every xk ∈ ∆(Ak) we have
(¯ zS,xk) ∈ Y, where ¯ zS := ρζ
S
ω + (1 − ρ)ηS
ω,k(xk) (conditions (3) hold as
equalities). It is a convex polytope since it is deﬁned by the ﬁnitely many
inequalities (3) that are linear in zS and xk (the outcomes ζ
S and ζ
S\k are
ﬁxed).
(ii) Assume there is zS ∈ ∆(AS) such that c = uS(zS,bN\S) ∈ C(ω)
satisﬁes c ≥ uS(ζ
S
ω,k) and ck > uk(ζ
S
ω,k). Replacing ζ
S
ω,k by zS preserves the
inequalities (3): indeed, the left-hand side increases by δ := ci−ui(ζ
S
ω,k) ≥ 0,
whereas the right-hand side increases by less than δ, speciﬁcally (ρ/|S|)δ;
see (1). Therefore (zS,xk) ∈ Y is also an acceptable announcement (with
the threat xk unchanged), but the payoﬀ of k is strictly higher there, which
contradicts (4). ¤
3 General Results
In this section we prove two general results of a standard type. First, we show
that SP equilibria exist; and second, that as the probability of repeat gets
close to 1—that is, as the “cost of delay” goes to zero—the SP equilibrium
outcomes approach Pareto eﬃciency.
3.1 Existence
Proposition 3 There exists an SP equilibrium.
Proof. We proceed by induction on S. For |S| = 1, say S = {i}, the strategy
of player i in state ({i},bN\i) consists of choosing zi ∈ argmaxxi∈∆(Ai) ui(xi,bN\i).
Let the state be ω = (S,bN\S), and assume that equilibrium strategies and
outcomes have been determined for all states ω′ = (S
′,bN\S′) with S′   S.
4This implies that uS(ζ
S
ω,k) is weakly Pareto eﬃcient in C(ω).
9For each c ∈ C(ω) (the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors for S) and k ∈ K, let
Φk(c) := {(z
S,x
k) ∈ ∆(A
S) × ∆(A
k) :
u
i(z
S,b
N\S) − (1 − ρ)u
i(η
S
ω,k(x
k)) ≥ ρc
i for all i ∈ S\k},
where ηS
ω,k(xk) is deﬁned in (2) (based on the ζ
S\k
(ω||bk), which have already been
determined by induction). The set Φk(c) is nonempty (take zS ∈ ∆(AS) with
uS(zS,bN\S) = c; then (˜ zS,xk) ∈ Φk(c) where ˜ zS = ρzS+(1−ρ)ηS
ω,k(xk)) and
is a convex polytope (note that ηS
ω,k(xk) is linear in xk); the correspondence
Φk is continuous on C(ω) (by Lemma 4 below). Therefore
Φ
∗
k(c) := arg max
(zS,xk)∈Φk(c)
u
k(z
S,b
N\S)
is a nonempty, convex-valued, and upper-semicontinuous correspondence (the
latter by the Maximum Theorem since uk is linear and thus continuous, and
Φk is a continuous correspondence; see, e.g. Hildenbrand 1974, Corollary to
Theorem B.III.4). Hence the same holds for the correspondences Ψk and Ψ,
deﬁned by
Ψk(c) := {u
S(z
S,b
N\S) : (z
S,x
k) ∈ Φ
∗
k(c)} and
Ψ(c) :=
1
|S|
 
k∈S
Ψk(c).
We can therefore apply Kakutani’s Fixed-point Theorem (see, e.g., Hilden-
brand 1974, C.III (14)) to the correspondence Ψ (with domain C(ω)), to
obtain ¯ c ∈ C(ω) with ¯ c ∈ Ψ(¯ c). This yields, in turn, ¯ ck ∈ Ψk(¯ c) with
¯ c = (1/|S|)
 
k∈S ¯ ck, and (¯ zS, ¯ xk) ∈ Φ∗
k(¯ c). It is immediate to verify that
the announcements (¯ zS, ¯ xk) for all k ∈ S constitute equilibrium announce-
ments in state ω. This completes the induction step, and thus proves our
claim. ¤
Remark. When ρ = 0 there is no need to use a ﬁxed-point theorem to
prove existence: the SP equilibria can be computed recursively, starting with
singleton S.
10In the proof we have used the following:
Lemma 4 Let D be an m × n matrix and put F(w) := {x ∈ Rn : Dx ≥ w}
for every w ∈ Rm. Then F is a continuous correspondence on W := {w ∈
Rm : F(w)  = ∅}.
Proof. Upper-semicontinuity is immediate. For lower-semicontinuity, let
x0 ∈ Rn satisfy Dx0 ≥ w0, and let wr → w0 with wr ∈ W for all r; we have
to show that for every r there is xr with Dxr ≥ wr. It suﬃces to consider the
case where only one coordinate of w0 changes, say, wr = w0 + (δr,0,...,0).
If δr → 0−, then take xr = x0. If δr → 0+, then let x1 satisfy Dx1 ≥ w1
(recall that w1 ∈ W), and then xr := (1 − δr/δ1)x0 + (δr/δ1)x1 satisﬁes
Dxr ≥ w0 + (δr,0,...,0) = wr. ¤
3.2 Pareto Eﬃciency
In equilibrium, every individual proposal ζ
S
ω,k is (weakly) Pareto eﬃcient (see
Lemma 2 (ii)). Therefore the outcomes ζ
S
ω may fail to be eﬃcient only if the
Pareto-eﬃcient boundary is not a hyperplane and the individual proposals
of diﬀerent proposers are diﬀerent (see (1)). However, if ρ is close to 1—
i.e., the “cost of delay” is small—then the early-proposer’s advantage will
be small, and so the individual proposals will be similar and their average
almost Pareto eﬃcient.
To see this, let ζ(ρ) be an SP equilibrium outcome for the PC bargaining
procedure with parameter ρ—we will refer to it as the PC “ρ-procedure.”
Consider a limit point ¯ ζ of ζ(ρ) as ρ → 1 (i.e., there is a sequence ρm → 1
such that ζ(ρm) → ¯ ζ as m → ∞). Then:
Theorem 5 Let ¯ ζ = (¯ ζ
S
ω)ω be a limit point as ρ → 1 of SP equilibrium
outcomes ζ(ρ) = (ζ
S
ω(ρ))ω of the PC ρ-procedures. Then for every state ω =
(S,bN\S) the limit outcome ¯ ζ
S
ω in state ω is Pareto eﬃcient for S given bN\S.
Proof. Assume for simplicity that ζ(ρ) → ¯ ζ as ρ → 1 (otherwise restrict
the arguments to the sequence ρm with ζ(ρm) → ¯ ζ). Put gω,k ≡ gω,k(ρ) :=
uS(ζ
S
ω,k(ρ),bN\S), gω ≡ gω(ρ) := uS(ζ
S
ω(ρ),bN\S), and ¯ gω := uS(¯ ζ
S
ω,bN\S) for
11all k ∈ S; thus gω → ¯ gω as ρ → 1. Let M be a bound on all possible payoﬀs
of all players; for each ρ we have
g
i
ω,k ≥ ρg
i
ω + (1 − ρ)u
i(η
S
ω,k(x
k),b
N\S) ≥ g
i
ω − (1 − ρ)2M (5)
(for i  = k it follows from (4), the deﬁnition of Y, and (3); for i = k, from
(4) together with (˜ zS,xk) ∈ Y for ˜ zS := ρζ
S
ω + (1 − ρ)ηS
ω,k(xk)). Now gi
ω =
(1/|S|)
 
k∈S gi
ω,k by (1), and so adding the inequalities (5) for all k except
some k0 ∈ S (keep i ﬁxed) yields
|S|g
i
ω − g
i
ω,k0 ≥ (|S| − 1)(g
i
ω − (1 − ρ)2M),
or
g
i
ω,k0 ≤ g
i
ω + (1 − ρ)(|S| − 1)2M ≤ g
i
ω + (1 − ρ)2M|N|
for all k0 ∈ S. Thus
−(1 − ρ)2M ≤ g
i
ω,k − g
i
ω ≤ (1 − ρ)2M|N|
(replace k0 by k to get the second inequality, and recall (5) for the ﬁrst);
hence, as ρ → 1, we get gi
ω,k − gi
ω → 0, which, since gi
ω → ¯ gi
ω, implies that
gi
ω,k → ¯ gi
ω for all i,k ∈ S.
If ¯ gω is not Pareto eﬃcient in C(ω), then there exist k ∈ S and c ∈ C(ω)
such that c ≥ ¯ gω, with strict inequality in the k-th coordinate. Then c(ρ) :=
gω,k(ρ) + (1/2)(c − ¯ gω) satisﬁes c(ρ) ≥ gω,k(ρ), with strict inequality in the
k-th coordinate; also, for ρ close enough to 1, we have c(ρ) ∈ C (use the fact
that C is determined by ﬁnitely many linear inequalities and gω,k(ρ) → ¯ gω).
But this contradicts Lemma 2 (ii). ¤
4 Two Reference Cases: Two Players and
Transferable Utility
In this section we spell out the nature of our solution for two simple and
classical cases.
124.1 Two-Person Games
The SP equilibria of the PC procedure relate very directly to the Nash bar-
gaining solution for the case of two players (cf. Hart and Mas-Colell 1996a;
see also Houba and Bolt, 2002, for more on two-person bargaining games).
Given a two-person game G with N = {1,2}, for each player i ∈ N let qi
be the payoﬀ level that the other player j  = i can hold i to, by using pure
strategies; i.e.,
q
i := min
aj∈Aj max
ai∈Ai u
i(a
i,a
j).
Let
D := {u
N(z) : z ∈ ∆(A)} = co{(u
1(a),u
2(a)) : a ∈ A}
be the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors. (D,q) is called a two-person pure bar-
gaining problem, where D is the set of “feasible agreements” and q the “dis-
agreement point,” if q ∈ D and there exists d ∈ D such that d1 > q1 and
d2 > q2 (see Nash 1950).
Proposition 6 Let G be a two-person strategic game such that (D,q) is a
pure bargaining problem. If ¯ ζ
N is a limit point as ρ → 1 of SP equilibrium
outcomes, then uN(¯ ζ
N) is the Nash bargaining solution of (D,q).
Proof. ¯ ζ
N is Pareto eﬃcient by Theorem 5. If the Pareto boundary ∂+D of
D contains only uN(¯ ζ
N) then we are done, since the Nash solution is Pareto
eﬃcient. If not, assume ﬁrst that uN(¯ ζ
N) is an interior point of ∂+D. Let
ω = (N, ) be the starting state; since uN(ζ
N
ω,1(ρ) is weakly Pareto eﬃcient
and it converges to uN(¯ ζ
N), it follows that uN(ζ
N
ω,1(ρ)) ∈ ∂+D for all ρ
close enough to 1. For every b1 ∈ A1, the payoﬀ that player 2 gets in the
state ({2},b1) is v2(b1) := maxa2∈A2 u2(a2,b1), and so condition (4) says that
u1(ζ
N
ω,1(ρ)) maximizes u1(zN) subject to u2(zN) ≥ ρu2(ζ
N(ρ))+(1−ρ)v2(b1).
Therefore any b1 ∈ A1 that has positive probability in the threat x1 ∈ ∆(A1)
that is used by player 1 must make v2(b1) as small as possible (here we use
the Pareto eﬃciency of uN(ζ
N
ω,1(ρ)) ∈ ∂+D); but minb1∈A1 v2(b1) = q2, and
so u1(ζ
N
ω,1(ρ)) maximizes u1(zN) subject to u2(zN) = ρu2(ζ
N(ρ))+(1−ρ)q2.
A similar argument applies when we interchange the two players; from this
13it follows by standard arguments that the limit uN(¯ ζ
N) of uN(ζ
N(ρ)) as
ρ → 1 is precisely the Nash bargaining solution of (D,q); see for example
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a, Theorem 3). Finally, if uN(¯ ζ
N) is an extreme
point of ∂+D—it minimizes, say, player 1’s payoﬀ and maximizes player 2’s
payoﬀ on ∂+D—then the above argument applies only to ζ
N
ω,1(ρ); for ζ
N
ω,2(ρ)
we get some ˆ q1(ρ) ≥ q1 such that u2(ζ
N
ω,2(ρ)) maximizes u2(zN) subject to
u1(zN) = ρu1(ζ
N(ρ))+(1−ρ)ˆ q1(ρ). Therefore uN(¯ ζ
N) is the Nash bargaining
solution of (D,(ˆ q1,q2)) where ˆ q1 ≥ q1 is a limit point of ˆ q1(ρ) as ρ → 1; given
that uN(¯ ζ
N) is that extreme point of ∂+D where player 1’s payoﬀ is minimal,
it easily follows that uN(¯ ζ
N) is also the solution of (D,q). ¤
Remark. One could well have q / ∈ D; for example, in the “matching-
pennies” game, D is the line segment connecting (1,−1) and (−1,1), and
q = (1,1). In this case we have a “reverse pure bargaining problem” and
uN(¯ ζ
N) is its solution (see the discussion in Section 4 of Hart and Mas-Colell
1996a; uN(¯ ζ
N) in this example is (0,0)).
4.2 Transferable Utility
Given the game G, the individual rational level in pure actions of player i is
r
i := max
ai∈Ai min
aN\i∈AN\i u
i(a
i,a
N\i) = max
ai∈Ai min
zN\i∈∆(AN\i)
u
i(a
i,z
N\i);
this is the maximum that i can guarantee by using pure strategies. The payoﬀ
of player i in any equilibrium of the PC procedure will always be at least ri
(the following strategy σi guarantees ri: when i is the proposer his threat is
some ai ∈ Ai where the max is attained (i.e., minaN\i∈AN\i ui(ai,aN\i) = ri
holds), and when he is the responder he never accepts any payoﬀ less than5
ri). Thus, only payoﬀ vectors c = (ci)i∈N that are individually rational—i.e.,
ci ≥ ri for each i—matter.
We say that the game G is a strategic game with transferable utility (a
5The intuitive reason why ri is based on pure actions of i (rather than mixed ones) is
that if i’s proposal is rejected then the randomization in his threat xi ∈ ∆(Ai) is realized,
and from then on i is ﬁxed at a pure action that is known to everyone.
14“strategic TU game” for short) if for every state ω = (S,bN\S), i.e., for
every S ⊂ N and bN\S ∈ AN\S, there exists a number v(ω) ≡ v(S,bN\S)
such that every Pareto eﬃcient and individually rational payoﬀ vector c in
C(ω) := {uS(zS,bN\S) : zS ∈ ∆(AS)} satisﬁes
 
i∈S
c
i = v(ω) ≡ v(S,b
N\S). (6)
If G is a strategic TU game, then the SP equilibria of the PC procedure
become relatively simple to determine. In particular, no ﬁxed point is needed
and the computation is not recursive, as the threats can be determined in-
dependently for each coalition S.
For every state ω = (S,bN\S), proposer k ∈ S, and mixed action xk ∈
∆(Ak), extend the deﬁnition of v( ) to mixed actions:
v(S\k,(b
N\S,x
k)) :=
 
bk∈Ak
x
k(b
k)v(S\k,(b
N\S,b
k)),
and deﬁne
τω,k := min
xk∈Ak v(S\k,(b
N\S,x
k)) = min
bk∈Ak v(S\k,(b
N\S,b
k)); and (7)
X
k
ω := arg min
xk∈Ak v(S\k,(b
N\S,x
k)) (8)
(note that Xk
ω consists of all pure actions bk ∈ Ak that are minimizers of
v(S\k,(bN\S,bk)), along with all their probabilistic mixtures). Finally, put
D
kv(ω) := v(ω) − τω,k = v(S,b
N\S) − min
bk∈Ak v(S\k,(b
N\S,b
k)); (9)
this is the “marginal contribution” of player k ∈ S in state ω = (S,bN\S).
A threat conﬁguration x = (xk
ω)ω,k is a collection of mixed actions xk
ω ∈
∆(Ak) for every state ω = (S,bN\S) and every k ∈ S; every N-tuple of
stationary pure strategies σ generates such an x: take the second coordi-
nate of the announcements (in state ω a proposer k announces (ζ
S
ω,k,xk
ω) ∈
∆(AS) × ∆(Ak)).
Next, let Π be the set of all |N|! orders of the players. For each order π =
15(i1,i2,...,iN) ∈ Π and threat conﬁguration x deﬁne a probability distribution
Qπ ≡ Qx
π on A as follows:
Qπ(b) :=
N  
m=1
x
im
ωm(b
im) (10)
for every b ∈ A, where, for each m = 1,2,...,N, we put Sm := {im,im+1,...,iN},
bN\Sm := (bi1,bi2,...,bim−1), and ωm := (Sm,bN\Sm). Taking the order π ∈ Π
to be random, with all |N|! orders equally likely, yields a joint probability
distribution Q ≡ Qx on Π × A:
Q(π,b) :=
1
N!
Qπ(b) (11)
for every π ∈ Π and b ∈ A. For each (π,b) ∈ Π × A and player i ∈ N,
let P i
π denote the set of predecessors of i in the order π, and let ωi
π,b =
(N\P i
π,bPi
π) be the state where each predecessor j ∈ P i
π has his action ﬁxed
at the corresponding bj.
Finally, let
φ
i := E
 
D
iv(ω
i
π,b)
 
(12)
be the “expected marginal contribution” of player i to his predecessors, where
E denotes expectation with respect to the distribution Qx on Π×A, and ωi
π,b
is the state determined as above.
Proposition 7 Let G be a strategic TU game with associated function v.
If σ is an SP equilibrium of the PC ρ-procedure, then the resulting threat
conﬁguration x = (xk
ω)ω,k satisﬁes xk
ω ∈ Xω,k for every ω and k (see (7) and
(8)). Conversely, for each x = (xk
ω)ω,k satisfying xk
ω ∈ Xω,k for every ω and
k, there exists an SP equilibrium σ with this threat conﬁguration. Moreover,
the payoﬀ of each player i ∈ N in that equilibrium σ equals φ
i of formula
(12), where the probability distribution Q ≡ Qx is determined by the collection
x = (xk
ω)ω,k according to (10) and (11).
Remarks. (1) The threats xk
ω and the payoﬀs do not depend on ρ. Moreover,
the determination of any set Xk
ω can be done independently of any other such
16set. This holds here, in the TU case, but not in general, where optimal threats
are determined recursively (i.e., one needs to determine ﬁrst the optimal
threats and proposals at all states that correspond to the subgames of ω).
(2) In every state, the payoﬀs and proposals are determined in the same
way, by considering only the appropriate subgame.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let σ be an SP equilibrium. For each ω =
(S,bN\S) and k ∈ S, let gω := uS(ζ
S
ω,bN\S) and gω,k := uS(ζ
S
ω,k,bN\S); since
gω,k is individually rational and Pareto eﬃcient in C(ω) (recall Lemma 2
(ii)), (6) implies that  
i∈S
g
i
ω,k = v(ω). (13)
Therefore, by (1), the same holds for gω:
 
i∈S
g
i
ω = v(ω). (14)
Moreover, (6) implies that maximizing the k-th coordinate gk
ω,k is equivalent
to minimizing all the other coordinates gi
ω,k, and so conditions (3) are satisﬁed
as equalities, i.e., for every i ∈ S\k,
g
i
ω,k = ρg
i
ω + (1 − ρ)u
i(η
S
ω,k(x
k
ω)). (15)
Summing this over i ∈ S\k yields
v(ω) − g
k
ω,k = ρ(v(ω) − g
k
ω) + (1 − ρ)t (16)
where
t :=
 
bk∈Ak
x
k
ω(b
k)
 
i∈S\k
u
i(ζ
S\k
(ω||bk),(b
N\S,b
k))
=
 
ak∈Ak
x
k
ω(b
k)v(S\k,(b
N\S,b
k)) (17)
17(we have used (14) for S\k). Rewrite (16) as
(1 − ρ)(v(ω) − t) = g
k
ω,k − ρg
k
ω (18)
=
 
1 −
ρ
|S|
 
g
k
ω,k −
ρ
|S|
 
j∈S\k
g
k
ω,j.
Therefore, in order to maximize gk
ω,k (i.e., to satisfy (4)), one must minimize
t (the other terms are ﬁxed here). But t depends only on the threat xk
ω (and
the given function v), and so t = τω,k and xk
ω ∈ Xk
ω; therefore (see (9) and
(18)):
g
k
ω,k = ρg
k
ω + (1 − ρ)D
kv(ω). (19)
Let
h
k
ω,i := u
k(η
S
ω,i(x
i
ω)) =
 
bi∈Ai
x
i
ω(b
i)g
k
(ω||bi) (20)
be the payoﬀ of k when i  = k becomes inactive and his threat xi
ω is imple-
mented; then (by (15), interchanging i and k):
g
k
ω,i = ρg
k
ω + (1 − ρ)h
k
ω,i.
Adding this over all i  = k together with equation (19) yields |S|gk
ω = ρ|S|gk
ω+
(1 − ρ)
 
Dkv(ω) +
 
i∈S\k hk
ω,i
 
, or
g
k
ω =
1
|S|

D
kv(ω) +
 
i∈S\k
h
k
ω,i

. (21)
Substituting (20) yields recursively formula (12). ¤
At this point it is useful to analyze a simple example.
Example. Let N = {1,2,3}, and for each i ∈ N put Ai = {0,1} × N, with
generic element ai = (ci,di) where ci ∈ {0,1} and di ∈ N. The payoﬀs are as
follows: ui(a) = ui
1(c)+ui
2(d), where: u3
1(c) = 1 when c1 = c2 and c3 = 1, and
u3
1(c) = 0 otherwise; ui
1 ≡ 0 for i = 1,2; and ui
2(d) := |{j : dj = i}|−1. Thus,
according to the ui
1-part of the payoﬀ functions ui, player 3 gets a payoﬀ of
181 when he chooses c3 = 1 and the ci-s of players 1 and 2 match; all other
payoﬀs are 0. The eﬀect of the ui
2-part is to allow transfers and therefore to
make the game TU: dj = i means that player j transfers one unit to player
i (i.e., the payoﬀ of i increases by 1, and that of j decreases by 1; note that
dj = j means that j makes no transfer).
Consider the PC procedure. The optimal threats are determined by (7);
this implies that there will never be any transfers (since this only increases
the worth of the remaining players after the proposer becomes inactive), and
so we will only specify the ci coordinate. Player 3 can always guarantee that
the remaining players get 0 (by using the threat c3 = 0). The only case where
his marginal contribution is not D3v(ω) = 1−0 = 1 is when the threats of the
players that became inactive before him made v equal to 0; this happens only
when 3 is last, and then the optimal threat of the second player to become
inactive, say player 2, is the opposite of that of player 1 (i.e., c2 = 1 − c1).
Therefore the SP equilibrium payoﬀs are (1/6,1/6,2/3).
It is interesting to compare this to the more familiar approaches. The
von Neumann–Morgenstern coalitional function is v(N) = 1, v(1,3) = 1/2
(player 1 plays c1 = 0 and c1 = 1 with half-half probabilities—denote this
(1/2,1/2)—and player 3 plays c3 = 1), v(2,3) = 1/2, and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
The Shapley value of this v is (1/4,1/4,1/2).
When going to the Harsanyi coalitional function we get6 v(N) = 1, v(1) =
1/4, v(2,3) = 3/4, v(2) = 1/4, v(1,3) = 3/4, v(3) = 1/2, v(1,2) = 1/2. This
is an inessential game, and its value is again (1/4,1/4,1/2).
Interestingly, the SP equilibrium payoﬀs (1/6,1/6,2/3) seem to reﬂect
better the underlying situation. The payoﬀs (1/4,1/4,1/2) are what one
would expect if {1,2} acted as one player, and then split the payoﬀ. But it
seems natural that the need to coordinate between 1 and 2 has some cost to
them, and the payoﬀ vector (1/6,1/6,2/3) captures this better.
6Take for example {1} vs. {2,3}. The optimal strategies are (1/2,1/2) for 1, vs.
(1/2,1/2) for 2 and c3 = 1 for 3, which give payoﬀs of 0 to {1} and 1/2 to {2,3}. Therefore
v(1) = 0 + (1 − 0 − 1/2)/2 = 1/4 and v(23) = 1/2 + (1 − 0 − 1/2)/2 = 3/4.
195 Equilibria with Fixed Threats
Threats are of the essence of the theory we are presenting in this paper. It is
because of the strategic linkage across coalitions captured by them that, for
example, we cannot in any general and meaningful sense factor our analysis
through the coalitional forms of standard cooperative game theory: there is
no “worth” of a coalition that is independent of the actions—the threats—of
the players outside the coalition.
This diﬃculty at the foundations of cooperative game theory has, of
course, been recognized for a long time. It has led, on the one hand, to the
development of extensions of the notion of coalitional form (perhaps the most
well known are the “games in partition form” of Thrall and Lucas, 1963; see
Myerson, 1977, Maskin, 2003, de Clippel and Serrano, 2005, Macho-Stadler,
Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2007, for more recent work) and on the other
to the consideration of particular situations where the classical form could
be justiﬁed (for example the c-games of Shapley–Shubik, see Shubik, 1983,
p.130).
Nonetheless, the discussion of the previous section, and especially expres-
sion (12) for the computation of the SP equilibria, suggests a close connection
to the cooperative-game solutions related to the Shapley (1953) value. In this
section we shall throw some light on this connection.
It is certainly the case that along an equilibrium path only the particular
actions that may arise as threats matter. But even then the threat of a
proposer may depend on the current set of active players and on the threats
of the preceding proposers. Still, if the threats happen to be independent
of the previous history, we could indeed associate a coalitional form to the
particular equilibrium, and we could then analyze how the equilibrium payoﬀs
relate to the cooperative game theory solutions of the coalitional form. This
we shall now do.
Deﬁnition. Let G be a strategic game and σ an SP equilibrium of the PC
procedure. For every player k ∈ N let fk ∈ Ak be a pure action of k. We
say that σ has ﬁxed threats (fk)k∈N if, with probability 1 (that is, along the
equilibrium path), whenever k is the proposer then the announced threat is
20fk.
Observe that the deﬁnition does not put any restriction on threats oﬀ the
equilibrium path.
Next, given a strategic game G and an SP equilibrium σ with ﬁxed threats
(fk)k∈N, we say that the NTU coalitional game (N,VG,σ) is derived from G
and σ if
VG,σ(S) = {c ∈ R
S : c ≤ u
S(z
S,f
N\S) for some z
S ∈ ∆(A
S)}
for every coalition S ⊂ N. We have:
Proposition 8 Let (N,VG,σ) be a game that is derived from the strategic
game G and the ﬁxed-threat equilibrium σ. Suppose that (N,VG,σ) is a TU
game in the individually rational region.7 Then the payoﬀs induced by σ equal
the Shapley values of (N,VG,σ) and its subgames. Moreover, if ρ is close to
1, then the payoﬀs of the proposals made by the diﬀerent players will also be
close to the Shapley values of (N,VG,σ).
Thus, when (N,VG,σ) is a TU coalitional game—let v ≡ vG,σ denote its
TU coalitional function—the outcome conﬁguration ζ of σ satisﬁes ui(ζ
S
(S,fN\S)) =
Sh
i(S,vG,σ) for every i ∈ S ⊂ N; moreover, as ρ → 1 we also have ui(ζ
S
(S,fN\S),k) =
Sh
i(S,vG,σ) for every i,k ∈ S ⊂ N.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 7; see in particular the explicit
computational formula there. Note that the ﬁxed threats imply that what
a coalition can obtain is well deﬁned, in the sense of not depending on the
order in which the inactive players have dropped out. ¤
Proposition 8 does show that in a very natural sense the solution concept
we develop in this paper, SP equilibrium of the PC procedure, is an extension
to a larger context of the Shapley value solution for TU coalitional form
games.
7I.e., for every S ⊂ N there is a real number v(S) such that c ∈ VG,σ(S) and ci ≥ ri
for all i ∈ S if and only if
 
i∈S ci ≤ v(S).
21What happens in the general NTU case? One may conjecture, that, as in
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a), as ρ approaches 1 the SP equilibrium payoﬀs
approach a Maschler–Owen (1992) consistent NTU value of (N,VG,σ). It is
not diﬃcult to see that this is indeed the case if, for every S, the limit of the
SP equilibrium payoﬀs of S lies in a smooth piece of the eﬃcient boundary
of8 VG,σ(S). Since this set is a convex polytope, the condition amounts to the
requirement that each limit lies in the interior of some (|S|−1)-dimensional
face of the polytope. In particular, this will be automatically satisﬁed if
(N,VG,σ) is a hyperplane game (Maschler and Owen, 1989; of course only the
individually rational region matters, as in Proposition 8 for the TU case).
But a general analysis of the non-smooth case is needed.
6 Games with Damaging Actions
Are there classes of games in strategic form that, from the standpoint of
the PC procedure, lend themselves to being summarized by means of the
coalitional form of cooperative game theory? Presumably, these would be
concrete speciﬁcations of the c-games of Shapley–Shubik.
In this section we exhibit one such class of games by presenting a prop-
erty of strategic forms that, for TU games, implies the existence of an SP
equilibrium enjoying the ﬁxed-threat property. The NTU case is discussed
in the next section.
It is reasonable to expect that the strategic linkage through threats is
bound to be simpler in situations where there is some form of “strategic
dominance” or “universality” in the threats used by players. This suggests
the following:
Deﬁnition. Given a game G, a player k ∈ N has a damaging action dk ∈ Ak
if ui(dk,aN\k) ≤ ui(a) for every action proﬁle a ∈ A and every player i  = k.
A game G is a d-game if every player k ∈ N has a damaging action.
8See Hart and Mas-Colell 1996a, Proof of Proposition 8 (with the correction
at http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/abs/nbarg.html) for the reason for the smoothness
requirement.
22That is, a d-game is such that whatever the play is, if player k switches
his action to dk then the payoﬀs of all the other players decrease or stay the
same; it is a strong property. The next proposition shows that, indeed, the
“d” concept helps relate our approach to cooperative game theory.
Proposition 9 Let G be a strategic TU game. Suppose that G is a d-game.
Then there exists a ﬁxed-threat SP equilibrium of the PC procedure where
each player i uses a damaging action as threat.
Proof. Let dk be a damaging action of player k. Recall (Proposition 7) that
at an SP equilibrium of a strategic TU game a proposer k chooses a threat
xk ∈ ∆(Ak) at state ω = (S,bN\S) so as to minimize v(S\k,(bN\S,xk)), the
sum of the payoﬀs of the remaining players if the proposer becomes inactive.
Obviously, the pure threat dk will do the job for k, at any state. ¤
7 Market Games Are Not c-Games
Propositions 8 and 9 highlight in a clear way the relationship between the
bargaining theory we develop in this paper and classical cooperative game
theory: if threats are “self-evident” then they can be taken as ﬁxed threats,
a coalitional form emerges in the obvious manner, and the analysis can pro-
ceed by taking the coalitional form as the basic datum and appealing to the
extensive and rich theory of cooperative games. But Proposition 9 was stated
for the TU case. In this section we shall see by means of an example that
the result is no longer true for the general NTU situation and that this is so
for entirely non-pathological reasons, that is, for reasons that seem inherent
in the nature of strategic bargaining among the many. It is therefore very
questionable whether, even under the strong hypothesis of the players having
damaging actions, bargaining theory in the strategic form can justiﬁably be
factored through cooperative game theory (except in the TU case).
The example will be built over a pure exchange economy satisfying the
standard conditions (no externalities, concavity, and monotonicity of pref-
erences, etc.). We choose this framework because exchange economies have
23been thought to be the paradigmatic cases of c-games (“c” stands for “con-
sent”), i.e., the sort of games where the self-evident coalitional form was fully
adequate (in the interesting discussion of Shubik, 1983, p. 131, it is said “in
economic theory, games satisfying the consent condition arise in many places,
most notably in models of pure competition without externalities”). We shall
see in the example below that the obvious damaging threat of never sharing
your endowment is not always the optimal threat! The phenomenon is related
to the well-known transfer and endowments paradoxes of general equilibrium
theory (see, for example, Postlewaite, 1979; also, Mas-Colell, 1976), but we
should emphasize that here these emerge internally to the theory, i.e., within
well-speciﬁed rules of a game.
Example. An exchange economy with 4 commodities and 3 traders. Let
the commodities be b,c,f,g, and the traders, 1,2,3. The initial endowments
are
e
1 = (0,0,1,1),
e
2 = (0,1,0,0),
e
3 = (1,0,0,0),
and the utility functions are
u
1(b,c,f,g) = b,
u
2(b,c,f,g) = b + c − 1,
u
3(b,c,f,g) =
1
2
c + max
b′+b′′=b
b′,b′′≥0
 
1
2
min{b
′,f} + min{b
′′,g}
 
.
The goods b and c are mediums of exchange (“money”); player 2 has a
“technology” which takes b as input and transforms it into “utils” subject to
capacity constraints determined by f and g, where the productivity through
g is twice as high as the one though f.
We make the exchange economy into a strategic game in a natural way,
as ﬁrst formally suggested by Scarf (1971): each player i distributes his
endowment ei among the 3 players: ei =
 3
j=1 di,j, where di,j ∈ R3
+ is the
24bundle transferred from i to j; the outcome (ﬁnal holding) of player j is thus
hj =
 3
i=1 di,j, and his payoﬀ is wj = uj(hj).
Note that in this game every player has a damaging action: to keep all
his endowment for himself (i.e., di,i = ei). Suppose ﬁrst that these are indeed
the threats; the resulting coalitional function is (in the individually rational
region, i.e., where all payoﬀs are nonnegative) a TU game for all coalitions
except {2,3}. We get v(i) = 0 for all i, v(1,2) = 0,and v(1,3) = v(1,2,3) =
1. As for {2,3}, the Pareto eﬃcient boundary is on the line w2 + 2w3 = 1.
Computing the payoﬀ vectors yields9 (0,0, ) for {1,2}, (1/2, ,1/2) for {1,3},
and ( ,1/2,1/4) for {2,3}; extending them to eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors for the
grand coalition N = {1,2,3} and then averaging gives the ﬁnal outcome of10
(1/4,1/6,7/12).
However, this does not yield an equilibrium, because player 1 has a better
threat when he is the proposer in the grand coalition, namely, to transfer his
unit of the f good to player 3. Notice that this threat does not change
the nonnegative attainable set for coalition {2,3}, but player 3 now gets by
himself 1/2 rather than 0. The negotiating terms in coalition {2,3} have been
altered, and the outcome of this coalition becomes ( ,0,1/2); this implies that
player 1 can make a demand of 1/2 (instead of the 1/4 that he could ask for
when the threat was to keep his own resources). The outcome of the grand
coalition is now (1/3,0,2/3)—and so player 1’s payoﬀ has increased from
1/4 to 1/3 by the above deviation. In a sense, by this action player 1 has
successfully manipulated in his favor the bargaining between 2 and 3 (note
that this could not happen in the TU case, because only the total payoﬀ of
{2,3} matters to 1).
So, what are the SP equilibria in this example? Since the eﬃcient bound-
aries of the attainable sets for {1,2,3} and all coalitions except {2,3} are
TU, keeping one’s endowment is optimal, except for player 1 in the grand
coalition. His threat in this case must minimize the sum of the payoﬀs of 2
and 3 in the subgame after 1 becomes inactive (since 1 gets the diﬀerence
between v(1,2,3) = 1 and that sum). Now this sum is at least 1/2, since
9A dot ( ) is put for the coordinate of the missing player.
10See Hart (2004, Section 5) for a similar computation.
25the outcome ( ,0,1/2) is always feasible for {2,3} (even without any trans-
fers). By transferring 1 unit of good f to player 3, player 1 makes sure that
( ,0,1/2) is necessarily the outcome of {2,3}—so this is the optimal threat
of player 1 in coalition {1,2,3}. Thus the unique SP equilibrium payoﬀs for
the grand coalition are (1/3,0,2/3) as seen above. Note in particular that
the unique optimal threat of 1 in {1,3} is to keep his own endowment, and
so the SP equilibria11 do not have the ﬁxed-threat property.12
In conclusion, strategic market games, a classical instance of the so-called
c-games, are not really c-games: one cannot simply deﬁne the coalitional
function as what a coalition can do with the total endowment of its members
(except in the TU case). Our point, however, is more general. In the example
above player 1, by using a suitable threat (which is not a damaging threat),
can alter—to his advantage—the relative bargaining powers of players 2 and
3 in the subsequent negotiation. In the general NTU case, where the spe-
ciﬁc subsequent agreement of a coalition of players matters to the proposer
(whereas in the TU case only the sum of payoﬀs matters to him), this is
bound to be pervasive.
From a diﬀerent perspective, we can view the analysis just made as under-
lying the existence of a substantial theoretical gap between the TU and the
NTU situations. One cannot take for granted that the interesting phenom-
ena that may hold for the former will carry over to the latter (for a diﬀerent
question—the equivalence principle—we made a similar point in Hart and
Mas-Colell, 1996b).
8 Extensions
We mention here a number of possible extensions, generalizations, and ques-
tions suggested by this study:
11While the SP equilibrium outcomes are unique, the strategies are not (for example,
player 1’s threat in coalition in coalition {1,2} is arbitrary).
12The curious reader might wonder what are the Walrasian equilibrium payoﬀs in this
example. They are (0,0,1), which arise from zero prices for goods f and g, and a positive
price for b that is no more than twice the price for c.
26(a) The PC procedure may be modiﬁed in various ways. Two options
that appear interesting are:
(i) A threat xk ∈ ∆(Ak) is not realized immediately after a rejected
proposer k becomes inactive, but rather at the end of the procedure. Thus
a state consists of the set of active players S together with the ﬁxed mixed
actions of the inactive players (xi)i∈N\S ∈
 
i∈N\S ∆(Ai).
(ii) Dispose with the threats altogether and make the inactive players
lose their power to choose their actions; thus a proposal is now a zN ∈ ∆(AN),
but only the active players are asked to accept it.
(b) Propose and study bargaining procedures that correspond to the
Harsanyi N-person generalization of Nash’s two-person variable-threat game.
(c) Characterize situations where ﬁxed threats and damaging actions ob-
tain.
(d) Characterize exchange economies where keeping one’s endowment is
an optimal threat, and study the connections to other solution concepts.
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